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RLUIPA and Eminent Domain: Probing the
Boundaries of Religious Land Use Protection
I. INTRODUCTION
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA)1 passed through Congress “by unanimous
consent”2 and was signed into law by President Clinton on
September 22, 2000.3 RLUIPA, described generally as “a bill
designed to protect the free exercise of religion from unnecessary
governmental interference,”4 represents the most recent in a series of
congressional responses to the Supreme Court’s restrictive rendering
of the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith, in
which the Court held that neutral, generally applicable laws need
only satisfy rational basis analysis, even though they may place
burdens on free exercise rights.5 Eager to reinstate a strict scrutiny
standard in free exercise jurisprudence, Congress first attempted to
countermand the Smith ruling with passage of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).6 However, in City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that RFRA was
unconstitutional and inapplicable to the states because it exceeded
Congress’s remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 After failing to pass a replacement for RFRA called the

1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
2. 146 CONG. REC. E1563 (2000) (statement of Rep. Charles T. Canady).
3. See Statement on the Signing of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1905, 1906 (Sept. 22, 2000) (“This Act recognizes the
importance the free exercise of religion plays in our democratic society.”).
4. 146 CONG. REC. H7190 (2000) (statement of Rep. Charles T. Canady).
5. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, as recognized
in Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2007). Although the statute superseded the Smith
holding for a time, the Supreme Court struck down 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb as unconstitutional in
City of Boerne. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000), amended by Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-4 (2000).
7. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C.
2000cc, as recognized in Spratt v. Wall, No. 04-112, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33266 (D.R.I.
Nov. 21, 2005); 146 CONG. REC. E1563 (2000) (statement of Rep. Charles T. Canady)
(describing how the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne resulted in the elimination of
any and all RFRA application to the states so that it remained “applicable only to the federal
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Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) in 19988 and 1999,9
Congress decided to narrow its focus in RLUIPA to two key areas:
land use regulation and state institutions.10
Academics have already produced a significant body of
scholarship and criticism on RLUIPA,11 focusing broadly on the
debate surrounding RLUIPA’s constitutionality,12 discussion of its
legislative merits,13 and evaluation of its effectiveness.14 By contrast,
legal scholars have directed far less attention to unanswered
questions suggested by the vagueness of the law’s scope and many of
its provisions. For example, while RLUIPA imprecisely defines “land
use regulation” as “a zoning or landmarking law, or the application
of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development
of land,”15 it also calls for broad statutory construction.16 Under
government”); see also Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959–60 (10th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that RFRA remains applicable to the federal government).
8. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998).
9. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999).
10. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen.
Edward M. Kennedy); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
11. For an extensive but incomplete list, see Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
RLUIPA Scholarship, http://www.rluipa.com/index.php/topic/21.htm (last visited Oct. 7,
2008) (listing law review articles).
12. See, e.g., Caroline R. Adams, Note, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Will RLUIPA’s Strict Scrutiny Survive the
Supreme Court’s Strict Scrutiny, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2361 (2002); Ariel Graff, Comment,
Calibrating the Balance of Free Exercise, Religious Establishment, and Land Use Regulation: Is
RLUIPA an Unconstitutional Response to an Overstated Problem?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 485
(2005). RLUIPA’s constitutionality was upheld by the first court addressing the issue. See
Freedom Baptist Church of Del. County v. Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 863
(E.D. Pa. 2002). The only court to strike down RLUIPA on constitutionality grounds was
overturned on appeal. See Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d
1083, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[RLUIPA] was enacted without the ambit of congressional
authority, and is therefore unconstitutional.”), rev’d, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006). This
Comment will only address the issue of constitutionality as it is relevant to the application of
RLUIPA in eminent domain proceedings.
13. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311 (2003); Stephen A.
Haller, Comment, On Sacred Ground: Exploring Congress’s Attempts to Rein in Discriminatory
State Zoning Practices, 33 SW. U. L. REV. 285 (2004).
14. See, e.g., Note, Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts under RLUIPA, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 2178, 2179 (2007); Sara Smolik, Note, The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was
It a Waste?, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723, 723 (2004).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-8(5) (2000).
16. Id. § 2000cc-5(g) (“This Act shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of
religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act and the
Constitution.”).
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RLUIPA’s regime, courts hearing arguments in the context of
religious land use thus face the daunting challenge of determining
the boundaries of RLUIPA’s application and force, with little clear
guidance from the statute’s terms. Perhaps Congress intended the
vague language as a means of securing the broadest possible
protection for religious exercise without running afoul of its
constitutional limitations. Whatever the case, RLUIPA leaves to the
courts the task of tracing the appropriate lines.
One of the most interesting border disputes to arise from this
vagueness problem is whether the statute’s definition of “land use
regulation” should be construed broadly enough to include eminent
domain proceedings.17 In the first case to hear the issue, Cottonwood
Christian Center v. City of Cypress,18 a federal district court held that
the city’s denial of a conditional use permit and invocation of
eminent domain against the church were subject to strict scrutiny
under RLUIPA.19 The court noted that, “[e]ven if the Court were
only considering the condemnation proceedings, they would fall
under RLUIPA’s definition of ‘land use regulation’ . . . [because the
City’s] authority to exercise eminent domain . . . is based on a
zoning system developed by the City.”20 Apparently classifying the
eminent domain proceedings as “the application of such a [zoning]
law,”21 the Cottonwood court adhered to RLUIPA’s broad
construction clause and marked the first boundary line accordingly.

17. At the commencement of this writing, only two commentators had addressed, in
cursory fashion, the issues involved in extending RLUIPA’s protection to the eminent domain
context. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land
Uses, 69 MO. L. REV. 653, 662 (2004) (concluding that RLUIPA “provide[s] a strict scrutiny
review standard . . . for any eminent domain action used to exclude or unreasonably limit
religious assemblies”); G. David Mathues, Note, Shadow of a Bulldozer?: RLUIPA and
Eminent Domain After Kelo, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1696 (2006) (concluding
without significant analysis that “RLUIPA’s definition of land use regulation includes eminent
domain actions”). Since then, three commentators have more squarely addressed the issue. See
Cristina Finetti, Comment, Limiting the Scope of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act: Why RLUIPA Should Not Be Amended to Regulate Eminent Domain Actions
Against Religious Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 667 (2008); Daniel N. Lerman, Note,
Taking the Temple: Eminent Domain and the Limits of RLUIPA, 96 GEO. L.J. 2057 (2008);
Alison Scaduto, Comment, RLUIPA as a Possible Shield from the Government Taking of
Religious Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 823 (2008).
18. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
19. Id. at 1220–22.
20. Id. at 1222 n.9.
21. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-8(5) (2000)).
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Subsequent courts have not been so eager to follow that
congressional mandate. For example, in St. John’s United Church of
Christ v. City of Chicago,22 the court took a much narrower view of
RLUIPA’s land use definition and the Cottonwood court’s analysis:
This Court is not willing to take such an expansive view, nor does it
believe that Cottonwood stands for such a sweeping proposition.
While this Court may not agree with the passing reference to
eminent domain in Cottonwood, that case can be read to suggest
that RLUIPA is applicable to the specific eminent domain actions
where the condemnation proceeding is intertwined with other
actions by the city involving zoning regulations.23

Another district court went further, holding without reservation
that RLUIPA does not apply to eminent domain proceedings.24 It
concluded that zoning laws and eminent domain were “two distinct
[legal] concepts,”25 pointed to the absence of eminent domain in the
statutory language,26 and criticized the Cottonwood court’s reasoning
as “not ‘persuasive as it relates to such an attenuated relationship
between eminent domain and zoning.’”27
With the battle lines clearly drawn, this Comment will probe the
boundaries of RLUIPA to determine whether eminent domain is
properly subject to its mandate. In spite of strong opinions to the
contrary, this Comment will argue that application of RLUIPA to
eminent domain proceedings is appropriate and reasonable given the
close causal nexus between zoning laws and eminent domain, the
broad construction of RLUIPA, and the substance of its
congressional record. This is especially true in cases like Cottonwood,
where the city appeared to initiate eminent domain proceedings
specifically to prevent the church from locating and developing on
the property.28 Even a limited application of RLUIPA better serves

22. 401 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 (2008).
23. Id. at 900.
24. See Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257
(W.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he Town’s employment of eminent domain to obtain the land is
simply too far removed from any zoning regulations to fall within the purview of RLUIPA.”).
25. Id. at 254.
26. Id. at 255.
27. Id. at 257 (citation omitted).
28. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. City of Cypress, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1231 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (“Although the City contends that Cottonwood is disturbing its long-planned
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the purposes of the statute and free exercise jurisprudence than a
complete denial of protection. In short, the Cottonwood court traced
the correct boundary.
Part II of this Comment will first summarize the facts and
analyze the reasoning of the few court cases addressing the
application of RLUIPA to eminent domain proceedings in an effort
to evaluate the strength of each court’s treatment of the issue within
the particular facts of the case. Next, Part III will examine the
relationship between zoning regulations and eminent domain and
argue that, in spite of their differences, the application of RLUIPA to
eminent domain proceedings is reasonable and justified—and not
legally untenable as some courts have held.29 Part IV will then
investigate RLUIPA’s enactment and the degree to which the
statutory language and congressional record allow for an extension
of protection to eminent domain even in the absence of specific
language to that effect. Ultimately, Congress intended RLUIPA to
provide broad protection for religious land uses constrained by land
use regulation throughout the country. Despite the generally
negative treatment of the Cottonwood court’s analysis by subsequent
courts faced with this issue, the court of first impression has been the
most faithful to the spirit and meaning of RLUIPA.
II. RLUIPA AS APPLIED TO EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE COURTS
With RLUIPA, religious land use litigation most often involves
zoning disputes.30 Zoning laws and regulations impact the “use,
building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious
exercise”31 far more frequently than eminent domain proceedings,
which are rare by comparison. In fact, since RLUIPA’s passage in
2000, only five cases have dealt directly with eminent domain
proceedings, beginning with Cottonwood. These cases seem to reveal
considerable conflict and tension in the construction of RLUIPA and
conception of zoning laws and eminent domain. However, it is
unclear whether this tension arises primarily from critical
development efforts, it was only after Cottonwood purchased that land that the City moved
aggressively to find other uses for the property.”).
29. See, e.g., Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254–58.
30. See Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Cases, http://www.rluipa.com/
index.php/case/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2008) (providing a comprehensive, but not complete,
listing of RLUIPA cases).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-8(7)(B) (2000).
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disagreements between courts, or if the divergent outcomes are
better explained with reference to the particular facts of each case.
Ultimately, if this trend continues, the Supreme Court will have to
determine RLUIPA’s scope.
A. Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency
In Cottonwood, the fast-growing Cottonwood Christian Church
was no longer able to accommodate its large congregation. To solve
the problem, the church spent five years finding a more suitable
location, eventually acquiring adjacent plots of land in a blighted
redevelopment zone. In total, the church amassed eighteen acres of
property, which it hoped to develop into a large church facility.32
While churches were permitted on the property acquired by
Cottonwood, city officials informed the church that the development
may not be “consistent with the goals and objectives of the
Redevelopment Plan.”33 In accordance with zoning regulations,
Cottonwood submitted an application for a conditional use permit.
However, city officials were making plans to build a Town Center on
the property, and denied the church’s application. Shortly thereafter,
the City Council adopted a moratorium on discretionary land use
permits for the property, effectively preventing Cottonwood from
moving forward.34
After the city determined that its Town Center plan was not
feasible, it decided to pursue a scaled-down, eighteen-acre retail
project to be located on Cottonwood’s property. The project
involved a Costco warehouse store. The city sent letters to the
church to determine whether Cottonwood had interest in the
project, but Cottonwood responded that it still wanted to build a
church.35 As a result, the city offered to purchase the Cottonwood
property.36 When Cottonwood refused, the city initiated eminent
domain proceedings to acquire the land.37 Cottonwood then
brought suit in federal court, claiming violations of its rights and
seeking an injunction.38 It argued, in part, that the city’s actions,
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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including the eminent domain proceedings, should be subject to
strict scrutiny as required by RLUIPA.39
The district court held that, under RLUIPA, strict scrutiny
should be applied for two reasons.40 First, Cottonwood’s proposed
development project would substantially affect interstate
commerce.41 Second, the city’s refusal to grant a conditional use
permit “involves a ‘land use regulation . . . under which a
government makes . . . individualized assessments.’”42 The city had
argued that only the eminent domain proceedings should be at issue,
and that “the exercise of eminent domain is not a ‘land use
regulation’ under RLUIPA.”43 But the court had already concluded
that the permit denial and eminent domain proceedings were
inextricably linked by the facts of the case.44 Moreover, the court
stated that, even excluding the permit denial, RLUIPA applies
because eminent domain proceedings fall under the statutory
definition of “land use regulation.”45 Finally, in a related freeexercise analysis, the court further determined that, along with its
actions in denying the conditional use permit, the city’s
condemnation efforts “are individualized assessments,” thus fulfilling
RLUIPA’s jurisdictional requirement.46
In this case of first impression, the court took a broad view of
RLUIPA’s definitions and jurisdictional provisions. Based on the
close connection between the city’s zoning laws and redevelopment
plans, and its eminent domain proceedings against the Cottonwood
property, the court treated eminent domain as a logical application
of the city’s zoning practices, thus broadly interpreting the statutory
definition of “land use regulation.”47 The court also firmly
established RLUIPA jurisdiction over eminent domain, based on

39. Id. at 1219–20.
40. Id. at 1221.
41. Id. at 1221–22.
42. Id. at 1222 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2000)).
43. Id. at 1222 n.9.
44. See id. at 1219 (“If the [c]ity has wrongfully failed to grant Cottonwood a CUP for
its church construction, then Defendants’ attempt to condemn land that had zoning
entitlements becomes a more difficult endeavor.”).
45. Id. at 1222 n.9.
46. Id. at 1223.
47. See id. at 1222 n.9.
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both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.48
B. Courts Responding to Cottonwood
Subsequent courts have largely disagreed with Cottonwood’s
broad view of RLUIPA’s boundaries in the eminent domain context.
1. Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton49
In Faith Temple, the court signaled a distinct break from the
Cottonwood analysis. Faith Temple involved a religious congregation
that had outgrown its former location and that sought a larger
property on which to build a church complex.50 Eventually the
church purchased a sixty-six-acre parcel immediately east of a park
owned by the town.51 The town, which claimed to be “surprised by
Faith Temple’s action,” had previously sought to acquire the parcel
to permit expansion of the park, but failed to agree on a suitable
price with the former owner.52 A few months after purchase of the
land by Faith Temple, the town began eminent domain proceedings
to acquire the land.53 The church brought suit alleging violation of
RLUIPA, among other claims,54 relying in part on the Cottonwood
court’s analysis.55
However, the Faith Temple court adopted a much narrower view
of RLUIPA than did the Cottonwood court. In clear contrast to
Cottonwood, the court held that the eminent domain proceedings at
issue in the case “do not amount to a ‘zoning law’ or ‘the
application of such a law.’”56 The court based its conclusion on the
status of zoning laws and eminent domain as “two distinct concepts”
in New York state law,57 and on the absence of eminent domain in

48. See id. at 1221–22. The Cottonwood court refers to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as the Enforcement Clause. See id. at 1221.
49. 405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
50. Id. at 251.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 251–52.
54. Id. at 252.
55. Id. at 256.
56. Id. at 254.
57. Id.
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the statutory definition.58 In response to Faith Temple’s argument
that Congress “would have wanted RLUIPA to apply” to the
particular facts of the case, the court curtly observed: “The statute
says what it says. Congress made no mention of eminent domain,
and it is not the Court’s proper function to add language to the
statute in order to stretch its applicability to suit the aspirations of a
particular litigant.”59 In addition, the court concluded that “the
connection between the eminent domain proceedings and any of the
town’s zoning laws is too attenuated to constitute the application of
a zoning law.”60 It firmly rejected as unpersuasive the Cottonwood
court’s suggestion “that any exercise of eminent domain that relates
in some way to a zoning plan falls within the scope of RLUIPA.”61
2. St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago62
In St. John’s, the courts again decided to exclude eminent
domain proceedings from the scope of RLUIPA. St. John’s involved
efforts by the City of Chicago to acquire parcels of land adjacent to
O’Hare airport, including land owned by a cemetery affiliated with
St. John’s Church, in order to facilitate expansion.63 Initially, the city
was enjoined from proceeding because it failed to follow the
required administrative procedure by obtaining approval from the
state Department of Transportation.64 In response to the injunction,
the city requested that the Illinois General Assembly pass the O’Hare
Modernization Act (OMA), which effectively stripped the Illinois
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of any power to prevent the
relocation of cemeteries or graves as part of the modernization
plan.65 As the city moved forward with its plans to acquire the land
through eminent domain, it “carefully considered the concerns of

58. Id. at 254–55. The court further stated that, while the statute’s clear meaning
rendered unnecessary consideration of legislative intent, analysis of RLUIPA’s legislative intent
also failed to support the church’s position. Id. at 255.
59. Id. at 255.
60. Id. at 256.
61. Id. at 256–57.
62. The St. John’s case was heard by both a federal district court, see 401 F. Supp. 2d
887 (N.D. Ill. 2005), and the Seventh Circuit on appeal, see 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 (2008).
63. St. John’s, 502 F.3d at 620–621.
64. St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 890–91.
65. Id. at 891.

1221

BAKER.FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/11/2008 1:47 PM

[2008

the religious entities in an exhaustive review.”66 Unsatisfied,
however, St. John’s Church filed numerous claims against Chicago,
its mayor, and the State of Illinois, including alleged violations of
RLUIPA and the Constitution’s Free Exercise and Due Process
Clauses.67
At trial, the district court held that “RLUIPA does not apply” to
the city’s eminent domain proceedings against the St. John’s
cemetery.68 It distinguished the facts of the case from Cottonwood,
stating that “[n]othing in the [case] leads to the inference that the
City’s authority to acquire the land stems from any zoning
regulations or landmarking law.”69 Commenting further, the court
declined to take Cottonwood’s “expansive view” of RLUIPA’s
provisions.70 Instead, the court underscored the absence of any
reference to “takings” in the statute and its own perception of the
differences between zoning laws and eminent domain, concluding
“that the [c]ity does not act pursuant to a zoning or landmarking
law.”71 At the same time, the court noted that “this should not be
taken to mean that all condemnation proceedings necessarily are
outside the scope of RLUIPA,” leaving the question open for further
review.72
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that
RLUIPA did not apply to the eminent domain proceedings at issue
in the case.73 The court extended the discussion contained in
previous cases, including Faith Temple and the St. John’s district
court ruling, that approached zoning laws and eminent domain as
distinct concepts: “As Illinois courts have long recognized, the
‘police power [zoning] and eminent domain are distinct powers of
government.’”74 Dismissing the Cottonwood statements as “brief
dicta,” the Seventh Circuit concluded that

66. St. John’s, 502 F.3d at 635.
67. St. John’s, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 891–92.
68. Id. at 899.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 900.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 641–642 (7th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 (2008).
74. Id. at 640 (quoting Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v. Chi. & Alton R.R. Co., 108 N.E. 312,
314 (Ill. 1915)) (alteration in original).
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[g]iven the importance of eminent domain as a governmental
power affecting land use, we think that if Congress had wanted to
include eminent domain within RLUIPA, it would have said
something. . . . Congress did not mention eminent domain in so
many words in RLUIPA’s definition of a land use regulation, which
is enough for us to consider it excluded.75

The court, in ruling that RLUIPA intentionally excluded
eminent domain, viewed RLUIPA’s boundaries even more narrowly
than the district court, which found that RLUIPA is not necessarily
inapplicable to all condemnation cases.76
3. City of Honolulu v. Sherman77
In City of Honolulu, Hawaii’s Supreme Court roughly followed
the reasoning of the Faith Temple and St. John’s courts. The case
involved eminent domain proceedings executed on a condominium
complex owned by the First United Methodist Church.78 At issue
was a city ordinance that authorized the city to acquire through
eminent domain “the fee simple interest in land situated underneath
condominium developments from the fee owners of the land in
order to convey fee simple title to the owner-occupants of the
condominium units.”79 In response to the condemnation
proceedings, First United filed suit for violations of its federal and
state constitutional rights and invoked RLUIPA as a defense to the
condemnation and conversion action.80 At trial, the court ruled that
“RLUIPA is inapplicable as a defense to conversion.”81
In the first state appellate court case to address RLUIPA’s
application to eminent domain, Hawaii’s Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court’s ruling.82 The Court began by discussing the
statutory definition of “land use regulation” and the nature of
zoning and landmarking laws. It concluded that to correctly apply
RLUIPA the city’s action “must pertain either (1) to the division of
a city into districts and the regulation of the land usage within those
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 641.
Id.
City of Honolulu v. Sherman, 129 P.3d 542 (Haw. 2006).
Id. at 546.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 546.
Id.
Id. at 547.

1223

BAKER.FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/11/2008 1:47 PM

[2008

districts or (2) to a monument, marker, or building having historical
significance.”83 The Court then marshaled support for its view from
previous decisions in St. John’s and Faith Temple, which denied the
applicability of RLUIPA to eminent domain proceedings.84
Moreover, it directly addressed First United’s argument that the
Cottonwood decision stood for the proposition that all exercises of
eminent domain are subject to RLUIPA:
The fact that the Cottonwood court denominated the authority of
the Cypress, California Redevelopment Agency to exercise its
power of eminent domain as being “based on a zoning system” has
no bearing on the present matter. The [Cypress] Redevelopment
Agency’s authority apparently emanated from “the Resolution of
Necessity” and a zoning system developed by that city, which by
no means signifies that all exercises of eminent domain are
grounded in a zoning system.85

Because the city ordinance at issue operated independent of any
zoning system or regulation, the eminent domain proceedings could
not have been construed as a zoning law subject to RLUIPA.86
However, the court failed to specifically consider whether the
proceedings in question could be the application of a zoning law.
4. Albanian Associated Fund v. Township of Wayne87
The district court of New Jersey decided the most recent
eminent domain RLUIPA case, in which Albanian Associated, a
growing Muslim congregation, acquired an eleven-acre tract of land
on which it hoped “to provide a place of public worship and prayer
in accordance with the traditions of the Islamic religion.”88 The
property, which had always been undeveloped, was located in a land
use zone that categorized a church building as a conditional use
requiring city approval and that the city maintained was “defined by
ordinance as ‘environmentally sensitive.’”89 The city claimed that
prior to Albanian Associated’s acquisition of the land it had
83. Id. at 561.
84. Id. at 561–62.
85. Id. at 564.
86. Id.
87. Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-CV-3217, 2007 WL 2904194
(D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007).
88. Id. at *1.
89. Id.
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announced a proposal to preserve open spaces in the city.90 While
Albanian Associated’s land development application remained
pending, and “nearly two and a half years after the open space
proposal was first introduced,” residents approved the Open Space
Referendum, “which would put aside a portion of resident tax
dollars to purchase and preserve open spaces.”91 One councilman
offered testimony suggesting that “the plaintiff’s application to build
its Mosque” was a principal reason behind the Referendum. The city
then formed an Open Space Committee, which determined that the
plaintiff’s property would be subject to the initiative. However, the
record showed no indication that the township ever notified
Albanian Associated of its decision.92
After several meetings were held to discuss the plaintiff’s
property, the Council decided to move forward with plans to acquire
the land.93 In spite of the suspicious circumstances, several Council
members testified in deposition “that the decision to acquire the
property was not motivated by an improper purpose.”94 The
township offered the plaintiff monetary compensation and suggested
alternative locations for the mosque.95 The plaintiff found that the
alternative sites suggested were not available for acquisition and
rejected the offer, at which point the township initiated
condemnation proceedings. In response, the plaintiff brought suit
for violations of RLUIPA and moved for a preliminary injunction
against the township. During the hearing on that motion, “it was
made apparent that despite approximately 102 properties identified
for the Open Space and Recreation Plan, only the plaintiff’s property
was being pursued through condemnation.”96 The court granted a
preliminary injunction until a final disposition could be
determined.97
After a full hearing of the case, the court concluded that
RLUIPA was applicable.98 It discussed at length the decisions in St.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *8.
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John’s and Faith Temple, but only briefly mentioned Cottonwood,99
which might be read as agreement with the former courts on the
issue of eminent domain. However, it attempted to avoid the
eminent domain question by holding that “the RLUIPA challenge
does not go to the actual taking, but rather the implementation of
the open space plan which is a land use regulation.”100 At the same
time, the court recognized the taking as “a method of
implementation,”101 suggesting, perhaps unwittingly, that eminent
domain could be classified as the application of a zoning or
landmarking law under RLUIPA. The overall lack of careful analysis
by the court undermines the authority of its conclusion that eminent
domain falls outside of RLUIPA’s scope.
C. Synthesizing and Reconciling the Case Law
A review of the relevant case law leaves unsettled the issue of
whether RLUIPA applies to eminent domain. In spite of the nearly
categorical pronouncements in St. John’s and Faith Temple against
the application of RLUIPA to eminent domain, those decisions
focused criticism on the notion that all eminent domain proceedings
fall within RLUIPA’s purview. But those cases do not stand for the
proposition that RLUIPA should never apply. In fact, the St. John’s
court specifically qualifies its ruling, saying that its holding “should
not be taken to mean that all condemnation proceedings necessarily
are outside the scope of RLUIPA.”102
Moreover, the facts of each case distinguish the divergent
holdings. While Faith Temple, St. John’s, and City of Honolulu all
argued against application of RLUIPA,103 the eminent domain
proceedings in those cases did not involve the close connection to
zoning laws and apparent discriminatory intent at issue in
Cottonwood and Albanian Associated Fund, where the facts strongly
favored treatment of eminent domain as an application of zoning or
landmarking laws.104 In fact, St. John’s involved airport expansion,
not zoning-based redevelopment, and the city clearly made every
99. Id. at *8–9.
100. Id. at *8.
101. Id.
102. St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900 (N.D.
Ill. 2005), aff’d, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 ( 2008).
103. See supra notes 49–86 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 32–48, 87–101 and accompanying text.
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effort to accommodate the concerns of the religious groups affected
while achieving the necessary ends of the project.105 However, in
Cottonwood and Albanian Associated Fund, the municipal defendants
appeared to be engaged in a bad faith attempt to prevent the
religious land use desired by the plaintiffs. When efforts to deny the
churches through ordinary zoning laws failed, the cities applied
eminent domain as a means to further their discriminatory purposes.
Thus, in spite of its distinct character, eminent domain represented
an application of zoning or landmarking laws sufficient to invoke
RLUIPA’s protections. If courts were to universally hold that
eminent domain proceedings fell beyond RLUIPA’s proper scope,
cities and municipal groups could simply exercise this power in a
manner seemingly independent of their own zoning regulations and,
in effect, frustrate the goals and purposes of RLUIPA. At the least,
RLUIPA application seems appropriate in situations involving
zoning-based redevelopment decisions subject to a high degree of
discretion.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ZONING LAWS AND EMINENT
DOMAIN
Parts III and IV will address the principal justifications given in
St. John’s and Faith Temple for denying application of RLUIPA to
eminent domain—namely, the separate and distinct nature of zoning
laws and eminent domain, and the absence of eminent domain in the
statutory language and congressional record.106 Part III concerns the
former, and Part IV the latter.
At issue here is RLUIPA’s definition of “land use regulation” as
“a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that
limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land.”107 In
order for RLUIPA to apply, eminent domain proceedings must fall
under this definition. St. John’s and Faith Temple would deny
application, relying on the basic characterization of zoning laws and
eminent domain as “‘two distinct concepts’ that involve land ‘in very
different ways.’”108 Authority to enact zoning laws comes from the
105. See supra notes 62–76 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2001).
108. St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 640 (7th Cir.
2007) (quoting Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254
(W.D.N.Y. 2005)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 (2008).
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police power, while authority to take property through eminent
domain comes from the sovereignty of the state. These courts would
argue that because the police power and eminent domain power
derive from separate sources, RLUIPA’s definition of “land use
regulation” includes the former, but excludes the latter.109
This analysis of RLUIPA is insufficient for two reasons. First, it
fails to take into account the degree to which eminent domain
proceedings arise out of zoning laws and, as such, represent an
application of those laws. Second, it ignores the ways in which the
Supreme Court’s own takings jurisprudence has connected these two
concepts. This Part will describe the legal character of zoning laws
and eminent domain proceedings, and then demonstrate the causal
nexus that links the two within the scope of RLUIPA.
A. Police Power: Zoning Authority and Regulations
The police power, as embodied in zoning laws and regulations,
rests on the concept that private property owners are entitled to
reasonable enjoyment of their property, “provided they [do] not
interfere with their neighbors’ reasonable enjoyment of their
properties and subject to reasonable regulations for the public
good.”110 As the Supreme Court has said, the term generally
“connotes the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment
upon private interests.”111 More specifically, “the police power is the
power of the sovereign to legislate in behalf of the public health,
morals or safety by general regulations.”112
In the context of land use regulation, the police power enables
states to enact zoning laws that, among other things,
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of
buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that may be
occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the
density of population, and the location and use of buildings,
structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other
purposes.113

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
Standard
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See id.
JULIUS L. SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42 (3d ed. 1950).
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.42.
Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254 (quoting N.Y. TOWN L. § 261). The
State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA), announced in 1922 by the United States
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This includes the creation of residential, commercial, or industrial
districts and, by extension, any development or redevelopment plan
initiated by the city or municipal group in order to promote the
public welfare.114 While local governments do not have independent
police power authority, the states delegate zoning authority to them
so that land use regulations are responsive to local issues and
needs.115
B. Eminent Domain Power
The power of eminent domain, by contrast, derives from “the
sovereignty of the state,” rather than any ownership or property
rights.116 Eminent domain has been traced all the way back to the
jurist Hugo Grotius, who described the power in 1625.117 Simply
put, “[e]minent domain is the power of the sovereign to take
property for public use without the owner’s consent.”118 Although it
“does not require recognition by constitutional provision,”119 the
power of eminent domain—along with its public use and just
compensation requirements—is countenanced by the Fifth
Amendment.120 Most state constitutions also include eminent
Department of Commerce, also reflects the main goals and concerns of zoning laws. It stated
that zoning laws should be enacted “to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to
promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the
overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; [and] to facilitate the
provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements.”
Advisory Comm. on Zoning, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, A Standard Zoning Enabling Act § 3
(rev. ed. 1926), available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnabling
Act1926.pdf.
114. Such zoning laws “are a relatively modern invention,” beginning around the turn of
the twentieth century. Faith Temple Church, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 254 n.3 (citing Village of
Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926)).
115. See, e.g., Flower Hill Bldg. Corp. v. Flower Hill, 100 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907–08 (Sup.
Ct. 1950) (explaining how zoning laws protect communities through local zoning ordinances
aimed at preventing disruptive zoning changes that would upset the local way of life, property
values, and most desirable uses of land).
116. SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.13[4] (citing Shoemaker v. United States,
147 U.S. 282, 296 (1893)).
117. See Welch v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 108 F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1939) (“The phrase
‘eminent domain’ appears to have originated with Grotius who carefully described its nature,
and the power is universal and as old as political society. The American Constitution did not
change its scope or nature, but simply embodied it in the fundamental law.”); SACKMAN ET
AL., supra note 110, § 1.12[1].
118. SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.11.
119. Id. § 1.3.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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domain provisions, which do not grant the power but act as positive
limitations.121 Historically, governments have properly invoked
eminent domain to acquire private property for building highways
and railroads;122 to redevelop a blighted neighborhood;123 to
eliminate the “social and economic evils of a land oligopoly”;124 to
eliminate “a significant barrier to entry” into an important
commercial market so as to enhance competition;125 and to
reinvigorate a distressed local economy.126
C. Causal Nexus: Police Power and Eminent Domain
Based on the forgoing analysis, what generally “distinguishes
eminent domain from the police power is that the former involves
the taking of property because of its need for the public use while
the latter involves the regulation of such property to prevent its use
thereof in a manner that is detrimental to the public interest.”127
However, because the nature of the two powers and their respective
sources of authority differ, this distinction alone cannot provide a
definitive answer to the question of RLUIPA’s applicability. Instead,
we must seriously consider whether eminent domain proceedings
constitute an application of zoning laws, as the Cottonwood court
held, and to what degree the concepts have been conflated in takings
jurisprudence.
1. Application of zoning or landmarking laws
For some scholars, common sense demands that eminent domain
be treated as an application of zoning or landmarking laws for the
purposes of RLUIPA analysis.128 After all, “any eminent domain
action can likely be traced to a local government’s comprehensive
plan or zoning system and can thus be considered the government’s
application of a zoning law or landmarking law, subject to

121. SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.3.
122. See, e.g., Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 366 (1930); West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 512 (1848).
123. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
124. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241–42 (1984).
125. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1015 (1984).
126. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005).
127. SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.42 (emphasis in original).
128. See, e.g., Saxer, supra note 17, at 670; Mathues, supra note 17, at 1664–68.
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RLUIPA.”129 Thus, the most “critical” aspect of RLUIPA’s
applicability to eminent domain proceedings is the statute’s
“application” clause, which broadens the scope of RLUIPA to cover
“most condemnations . . . executed pursuant to a zoning system.”130
In application, however, a majority of courts addressing this issue
have failed to recognize RLUIPA’s “application” clause as sufficient
to cover eminent domain proceedings.131
The courts’ failure to find RLUIPA’s “application” clause as
sufficient grounds for application to eminent domain proceedings
results primarily from a lack of careful analysis of the clause itself. For
example, the St. John’s and Faith Temple courts never examined the
precise relationship between the zoning laws and condemnation
proceedings. Instead, the courts quickly concluded that “the
connection between the eminent domain proceedings and any . . .
zoning laws is too attenuated to constitute the application of a
zoning law.”132 In a subsequent case, the City of Honolulu court
simply adopted the logic of St. John’s and Faith Temple—which
rejected Cottonwood’s conclusions—without any discussion of
whether the conversion action constituted an application of the city’s
zoning laws.133 In Albanian Associated Fund, the court described the
eminent domain proceedings in relation to the zoning laws at issue
as a “method of implementation,” but strangely failed to discuss the
significance of this characterization in light of RLUIPA’s application
clause.134
By contrast, “even while rejecting the plaintiffs’ request to apply
RLUIPA to all condemnations,” the federal district court in St.
John’s at least recognized the close relationship that can develop
between zoning and eminent domain, and “pointed out that if the
city condemned land and then rezoned the land, RLUIPA would
likely come into play.”135 Whether courts carefully analyze the issue
or not, the fact remains that when a governmental body initiates
eminent domain proceedings to acquire land in furtherance of its

129.
130.
131.
132.
2005).
133.
134.
135.

Saxer, supra note 17, at 670.
Mathues, supra note 17, at 1664.
See supra Part II.
Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250, 256 (W.D.N.Y.
See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Mathues, supra note 17, at 1666.
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land use goals and zoning system, it has effectively applied the
zoning laws to the property. Stated plainly, “[t]his connection is real,
not attenuated,”136 and courts would be wise to examine the facts of
each case to determine the degree of connection.
2. Takings jurisprudence and the coterminous relationship
Courts denying application of RLUIPA to eminent domain also
fail to recognize the ways in which the Supreme Court’s takings
jurisprudence has linked the two concepts together.137 Despite the
distinction drawn between police power regulations and eminent
domain power takings,
[f]rom one point of view there is a considerable resemblance
between the police power and the power of eminent domain in that
each power recognizes the superior right of the community against
the selfishness of the individuals, the one preventing the use by an
individual of his own property in his own way as against the general
comfort and protection of the public, and the other depriving him
of the right to obstruct the public necessity and convenience by
obstinately refusing to part with his property when it is needed for
the public use.138

The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this connection in
its takings jurisprudence. As early as 1954 in Berman v. Parker, the
Court asserted that the eminent domain public use requirement is
met by a valid exercise of the police power, as determined by the
legislative body; in other words, eminent domain can be an
appropriate means of “executing the project” dictated by police
power concerns.139 Therefore, the notion that eminent domain can
represent the application of zoning laws based on the police power
appears to be consistent with established Supreme Court doctrine.
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court further
clarified the relationship between police power and eminent domain,
observing that “[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”140 It then

136. Id. at 1667.
137. I am indebted to Professor John Fee for helping me develop this approach to the
relationship between zoning laws and eminent domain.
138. SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 110, § 1.42.
139. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954).
140. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (emphasis added).
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acknowledged the narrow judicial role in reviewing legislative
judgments, where “the eminent domain power is equated with the
police power.”141 As with some of the RLUIPA cases described
above, this connection between the exercise of police power and
eminent domain is real, not attenuated.142
In addition, a more recent and more controversial case, Kelo v.
City of New London,143 clearly demonstrates how the relationship
between the exercise of the police power and eminent domain works
in practice. In Kelo, a local government, with the goal of furthering
economic development in a distressed area, attempted to seize
private property through eminent domain for the benefit of another
private party.144 The Court held that the takings were constitutional,
showing great deference to the city’s judgments concerning the
problem of economic distress and the proposed solution:
The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan
that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community,
including—but by no means limited to—new jobs and increased
tax revenue. As with other exercises in urban planning and
development, the City is endeavoring to coordinate a variety of
commercial, residential, and recreational uses of land, with the
hope that they will form a whole greater than the sum of its parts.
To effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a state statute that
specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote
economic development.145

In other words, the exercise of eminent domain in this case
represents a valid application of government police power, in the
form of land use plans and zoning systems, to address a serious
problem.
Given the vagueness of several RLUIPA terms, courts should
analyze their meaning with reference to the ways in which those
terms are defined by the Supreme Court in analogous or similar
contexts.146 The coterminous relationship between zoning laws and

141. Id.
142. See supra text accompanying note 136.
143. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
144. Id. at 473–75.
145. Id. at 483–84.
146. Courts and legislative bodies frequently employ this kind of analogical or
comparative analysis to determine the meaning of unclear terms. In fact, RLUIPA’s own
congressional record demonstrates this approach:
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eminent domain established in the takings cases shows that
condemnation proceedings can, and often do, represent an
application of zoning laws.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS
As described above, courts rejecting the application of RLUIPA
to eminent domain have also based this conclusion on the apparent
lack of specific references to eminent domain in the statutory
language and congressional record.147 While this is an attractive
assertion, and courts should not “add language to the statute in
order to stretch its applicability,”148 it should not be considered
dispositive of the issue when the statute’s provisions and the
congressional record imply a broader reading. Taken in totality,
there is at least an equally reasonable argument that Congress did in
fact intend for RLUIPA to apply in cases of eminent domain.
A. RLUIPA’s Statutory Language and Construction
Answering the question of whether Congress intended RLUIPA
to cover eminent domain within its borders requires more than a
literal reading of the statutory terms. From the start, we must
concede that the terms “eminent domain,” “condemnation,” and
“takings” are never mentioned by name in any of RLUIPA’s
provisions. For some courts this is sufficient on its own, without
delving into deeper analysis of the statute’s history and congressional
record, to support the denial of RLUIPA protection.149 At the same
time, however, the statute employs conspicuously broad terms,
suggesting a more inclusive—and less literal—intent. Most
significantly, Section 3 specifically mandates a broad construction of
The Act does not include a definition of the term ‘substantial burden’ because it is
not the intent of this Act to create a new standard for the definition of ‘substantial
burden’ on religious exercise. Instead, that term as used in the Act should be
interpreted by reference to Supreme Court jurisprudence.
146 CONG. REC. S7776 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy).
147. See, e.g., supra notes 58–59, 71, 75 and accompanying text.
148. Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 259, 255 (W.D.N.Y.
2005).
149. See, e.g., St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 641 (7th
Cir. 2007) (“Congress did not mention eminent domain in so many words in RLUIPA’s
definition of a land use regulation, which is enough for us to consider it excluded.”), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 2431 (2008).
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RLUIPA’s provisions: “This Act shall be construed in favor of a
broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of this Act and the Constitution.”150 By itself,
this clause seems to preclude the strictly literal reading imposed on
the statute by some courts.151
And yet, even without the clause, the open language of RLUIPA
recommends a broader approach to its application. For example,
“[t]he term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief.”152 This definition is expansive and, on its face, appears to
cover all religions and forms of religious action. Moreover, in
contrast to the more limited scope of its predecessors—such as
RFRA, which was based entirely on remedial powers derived from
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—RLUIPA applies in three
separate instances: (1) where the burden involves a federally funded
program; (2) where the burden, or removal of the burden, affects
interstate commerce; or (3) where the burden comes from the
application of land use regulations that allow the government to
make “individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the
property involved.”153 While these alternative bases for jurisdiction
were no doubt included partly to insulate RLUIPA from the
constitutional challenges that ultimately doomed RFRA,154 their
inclusion also clearly expresses a desire for broad applicability to
religious land use cases.
The call for broad construction of RLUIPA’s provisions further
supports the arguments for application to eminent domain described
in Part III. Given the real connection between zoning laws and
eminent domain proceedings, a broad construction of the statute
should comfortably allow for the classification of eminent domain as
an application of zoning or landmarking laws. Courts that impose a
strict construction on the statute’s terms to exclude eminent domain
have, in fact, violated the statute’s broad construction clause. Those

150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3 (2000).
151. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000).
153. Id. §§ 2000cc-(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2000).
154. See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (“The hearings also intensely examined Congress’s constitutional
authority to enact this bill in light of recent developments in Supreme Court federalism
doctrine.”).
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courts that are faithful to the command have, as one scholar
observes, produced broad results not literally required by the statute
on its face.155 This includes the extension of “land use regulation” to
cover both state and local regulations,156 and a determination that
“nonaction [could] constitute an act pursuant to a zoning
ordinance.”157 Extending the boundaries of RLUIPA to include
eminent domain proceedings as an application of zoning or
landmarking laws best effectuates RLUIPA’s broad intentions.
Finally, with few exceptions, eminent domain proceedings clearly
require government to make “individualized assessments of the
proposed uses for the property involved.”158 Generally treated as the
codification of free exercise doctrines laid down by the recent
Supreme Court decisions in Smith and Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah,159 RLUIPA’s jurisdictional hook thus brings eminent
domain proceedings within the statute’s reach. The Cottonwood
court describes how this applied to the particular facts of its case,
stating that
the Redevelopment Agency’s Resolution of Necessity and
Defendants’ efforts to condemn the land are individualized
assessments. By condemning the Cottonwood Property, the
Redevelopment Agency had to come to the decision that the
Cottonwood Property was blighted, that the Walker/Katella Retail

155. See Mathues, supra note 17, at 1666.
156. See Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1070
(D. Haw. 2002) (rejecting Maui County’s argument that state regulations merely “classified”
land while only local authorities “zoned” land).
157. Mathues, supra note 17, at 1666 (citing Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston,
Inc. v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-(a)(2)(C); see also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (arguing that land use regulations, including eminent domain
proceedings, are not neutral and generally applicable laws).
159. See 146 CONG. REC. S7775–76 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (citing those Supreme Court cases in discussion of the compelling
interest standard invoked when “government makes such individualized assessments”);
Mathues, supra note 17, at 1664 n.85 (“The ‘individualized assessments’ phrase follows the
Smith Court’s distinction between laws which are ‘neutral and generally applicable’ and
therefore subject only to rational basis review, and laws which are not neutral and generally
applicable and still subject to strict scrutiny.”). But see Graff, supra note 12, at 514 (“RLUIPA
represents a substantial departure from the individualized assessment doctrine as defined by the
Supreme Court in Smith . . . .”).
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Project was consistent with the Specific Plan and the LART plan,
and that condemning the land was the only solution.160

As the Cottonwood case illustrates, eminent domain proceedings
rely on several individualized assessments of both the zoning laws the
government applies and the proposed uses for the property by the
owner. Considered broadly, RLUIPA’s individualized assessments
prong expresses congressional intent that the statute apply to land
use regulations where individualized assessments are necessary—and
this includes eminent domain proceedings.
B. The Congressional Record
In addition to RLUIPA’s broad statutory language, the
congressional record reveals more support for application of its
protections to eminent domain proceedings against religious groups.
Although the record contains no direct references to eminent
domain, clear indications of the broad context of the bill and the
overwhelming focus on religious discrimination in land use
regulation suggests a more sweeping scope than has been applied by
some courts.
RLUIPA’s congressional record is replete with references to its
predecessor bills, including RFRA and RLPA, which were much
broader in scope. In his joint statement with Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, Senator Orrin G. Hatch remarked that “[i]t is no secret
that I would have preferred a broader bill [like RLPA] than the one
before us today.”161 In fact, RLPA defined “land use regulation” as
“a law or decision by a government that limits or restricts a private
person’s uses or development of land,”162 which would have
definitively included eminent domain proceedings. Later in the
record, a statement by Senator Harry Reid explained the reason for
the statute’s narrowing:
[T]he legislation stalled in the Senate when legitimate concerns
were raised that RLPA, as drafted, would supersede certain civil

160. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. City of Cypress, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1223 (C.D.
Cal. 2002). It should be noted that the Cottonwood court applied the individualized assessment
doctrine under Smith rather than RLUIPA. However, since the standard in RLUIPA simply
reflects the Smith Court’s decision, the difference is immaterial.
161. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen.
Edward M. Kennedy).
162. 145 CONG. REC. H5597 (1999) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
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rights, particularly in areas relating to employment and housing.
These concerns were most troubling to the gay and lesbian
community. . . . [A]s I was considering the merits of [RLPA], these
concerns weighted heavily upon my mind. . . . I am proud to have
had the opportunity to work with Senators Hatch and Kennedy to
accomplish the worthwhile endeavor of protecting legitimate civil
rights while at the same time protecting the free exercise of religion
involving land use decisions.163

It was out of concern for certain civil rights, not for eminent
domain power, that Congress decided to pass a more limited bill. As
Professor Saxer observes, “there is no indication that Congress
changed the definition language in order to restrict the type of land
use decision subject to RLUIPA.”164 Thus, although RLUIPA’s
definition of “land use regulation” seems narrower, this was
intended to protect civil rights that might otherwise be jeopardized,
not to exclude eminent domain or any other kind of land use
decision from the statute’s scope. Indeed, Senator Edward Kennedy,
one of RLUIPA’s co-sponsors, has proposed an amendment to
RLUIPA to include eminent domain in order to “restore
[RLUIPA’s] original intent and give religious assemblies and
institutions specific protection against eminent domain abuse.”165
In addition, the record’s consistent focus on the widespread
pattern of religious discrimination in the land use context, and the
resulting calls for legislative action further demonstrate congressional
desire for broad application of RLUIPA protections.166 According to
Congress,
163. 146 CONG. REC. S7778 (2000).
164. Saxer, supra note 17, at 668 (emphasis added).
165. Lerman, supra note 17, at 2078 (quoting Letter from Sen. Coburn and Sen.
Kennedy (June 30, 2006) (on file with the author)). While post-enactment statements are
generally disfavored as proof of intention, it is worth noting that RLUIPA and its predecessors,
RFRA and RLPA, were all enacted to restore religious protections removed by Supreme Court
decisions. It is conceivable, then, that Senator Kennedy’s statement reflected a similar desire to
restore protection against eminent domain removed by a majority of courts hearing RLUIPA
cases in the eminent domain context.
166. Because the record of religious discrimination covers only the zoning and
landmarking contexts, some might say that using it to justify application of RLUIPA to
eminent domain requires an unreasonable stretch of logic. However, as shown by the
Cottonwood and Albanian Associated Fund cases, local government bodies are starting to turn
to eminent domain as a way to prevent religious land use that they do not want in their
community. Moreover, the Kelo Court’s upholding of an eminent domain action for the
purpose of economic development, even though the property was being transferred from one
private party to another and the public benefit was unclear, raises the possibility that eminent
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[t]he hearing record compiled massive evidence that this right [to
assemble for religious purposes] is frequently violated. Churches in
general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are
frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and
also in the highly individualized and discretionary processes of land
use regulation. Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places
where they permit theaters, meeting halls, and other places where
large groups of people assemble for secular purposes. Or the codes
permit churches only with individualized permission from the
zoning board, and zoning boards use that authority in
discriminatory ways.167

In support of this broad pronouncement, the record includes
numerous anecdotal references to religious land use discrimination
across the country.168 John Mauck, a Chicago attorney specializing in
land use cases, estimated that thirty percent of the cases in Chicago’s
Zoning Appeals Board involve religious plaintiffs.169
Beyond the anecdotal evidence, Congress relied on two
significant statistical studies to substantiate the claim of widespread
discrimination and the need for a legislative solution. First, Brigham
Young University (BYU) conducted a study in which 196 cases
involving both zoning board decisions and free exercise challenges
were analyzed.170 One scholar summarized the study’s conclusions as
follows:
[S]mall religious groups, including Jews, small Christian
denominations, and nondenominational churches, are vastly
overrepresented in reported church zoning cases. Religious groups
accounting for only 9% of the population account for 50% of the
reported litigation involving location of churches, and 34% of the
reported litigation involving accessory uses at existing churches.171

domain might prove an easier hurdle to clear—especially if courts exclude eminent domain
from RLUIPA’s protections.
167. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen.
Edward M. Kennedy).
168. See generally 146 CONG. REC. E1564 (2000) (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde).
169. Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
755, 773 (1999) (citing conversation with Mauck in Washington, D.C., on June 16, 1998).
170. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 4019 Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 131–32, 141–46 (1998)
(discussing the BYU study).
171. Laycock, supra note 169, at 770–71 (discussing the BYU study data).
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A second survey focused on one of the larger, more prominent
churches in the country—the Presbyterian Church—yielded a similar
conclusion.172 According to the study, 10% of congregations
reported “significant conflict” over land use permits, while another
8% reported that conditions imposed by the government “increased
the cost of the project by more than 10%.”173 As a result of the
anecdotal and statistical evidence, Congress concluded that
“discrimination against religious [land] uses is a nationwide
problem” that requires immediate attention.174
More recently, the evidence and conclusions reported in the
congressional record have come under more focused scrutiny. Critics
of RLUIPA have challenged the claim of widespread discrimination
against religious land use that provided impetus for RLUIPA’s
enactment.175 However, most of the criticism strikes at the fringes,
and not at the heart, of the claims made during the congressional
hearings. For example, Stephen Clowney’s empirical study, which he
asserts “calls into question the wisdom of . . . federal involvement in
local land use decisions,” was entirely limited to zoning processes in
New Haven, Connecticut.176 Needless to say, the results from a study
conducted in one city are hardly conclusive. Others have directed
specific attacks at the methodology and conclusions of the BYU
study.177 Furthermore, detractors also point out that the
172. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on S.2148 Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 14–16 & Appendix, Question 9 (statement of Prof. Douglas
Laycock, University of Texas) (reporting data from survey of Presbyterian congregations).
173. Laycock, supra note 169, at 772 (discussing Presbyterian study).
174. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen.
Edward M. Kennedy).
175. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 13, at 346 (“The sheer size of the land use universe
makes the record of unconstitutional conduct cited in the RLPA hearings not ‘massive,’ but
rather minute.”); Stephen Clowney, Comment, An Empirical Look at Churches in the Zoning
Process, 116 YALE L.J. 859, 863 (2007) (“[T]his Comment questions the prevailing belief that
zoning ‘has become the most widespread obstacle to the free exercise of religion.’” (quoting
Laycock, supra note 169, at 783)); Graff, supra note 12, at 503 (“Congress has failed to
provide convincing evidence of pervasive religious discrimination in the application of land use
regulations.”).
176. Clowney, supra note 175, at 859–60 (“[T]his Comment . . . scrutinize[s] the
records of New Haven, Connecticut, to determine whether religious institutions are treated
fairly in the zoning appeals process.”).
177. See Adams, supra note 12, at 2397–400 (arguing that the study relied too heavily on
outdated statistics and was limited to zoning decisions appealed to the courts); Graff, supra
note 12, at 501–02 (“Durham departed from his own methodology by including Judaism as a
minority religion, as Jews constitute 2.2 percent of the population and exceed Durham’s
threshold standard of 1.5 percent.”). It is difficult to see how the classification of Jews makes
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congressional hearings failed to include “the most scientific study of
land use data and churches” at that time.178 The National
Congregations Study, a survey of 1236 congregations in a
“representative national sample,” found that only one percent of
churches reported denial of a permit or license.179 But it is difficult to
say how much weight to give the study because it only included
information on roughly half of one percent of congregations across
the country. The authors of the study even included several
disclaimers concerning the strength of the results in determining the
extent of religious discrimination.180 Despite some contrary studies,
the congressional record indicates through anecdotal and statistical
evidence a high level of religious discrimination.
It should be remembered that, after the compilation of the
evidence in the congressional record, RLUIPA passed both houses of
Congress unanimously.181 With its expansive view of the need to
protect religious liberty demonstrated by the focus on evidence of
discrimination, the congressional record provides further support for
the application of eminent domain under RLUIPA. But for the civil
rights challenges to its predecessor, there would be no need to make
this argument at all.182
V. CONCLUSION
In the end, courts will continue to determine whether RLUIPA
protects religious groups from discriminatory eminent domain
proceedings. Unfortunately, most of the courts that have heard the
issue have concluded that eminent domain falls outside the
boundaries of RLUIPA. These decisions have ignored the broad
statutory mandate, instead focusing on staid, traditional conceptions
of zoning laws and eminent domain that do not reflect the current
legal landscape or the vision of the Congress that enacted RLUIPA.

any difference to the overall purpose of the study to show the prevalence of religious
discrimination. Whether or not Jews are a minority religion, they were disproportionately
involved in land use litigation.
178. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 351.
179. Mark Chaves & William Tsitsos, Are Congregations Constrained by Government?
Empirical Results from the National Congregations Study, 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 335, 341
(2000).
180. Id. at 341–42.
181. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 161–164 and accompanying text.
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Eminent domain proceedings almost always involve the application
of zoning laws and regulations. This relationship is clear from the
RLUIPA cases described above, from the Supreme Court’s own
takings jurisprudence, and from the intent of Congress demonstrated
in the broad statutory language and congressional record. The
Cottonwood court got the question first, and got it right. With any
luck going forward, courts will glean from its analysis what should
have been evident all along: RLUIPA favors expansion.
Matthew Baker

1242

